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Amicus curiae Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc.
(“LatCrit”) respectfully submits this brief in support of PlaintiffsAppellants.1
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
LatCrit is a non-profit corporation whose purpose is developing,
promoting, and disseminating critical legal scholarship centering on the
Latina/o experience, and facilitating the work of legal and interdisciplinary
scholars, public interest lawyers, and non-governmental organizations
dedicated to eliminating subordination and promoting justice. To
accomplish these goals, LatCrit:
(a)

organizes conferences, workshops, symposia and similar
programs;

(b)

fosters diverse, interdisciplinary, transcultural and international
participation and perspectives;

(c)

promotes original research, field work and data collection;

(d)

publishes and promotes scholarship; and

(e)

conducts and collaborates in law reform projects and litigation.

One of LatCrit’s fundamental goals is developing and supporting the
next generation of diverse scholars, professionals, and other leaders. Such
1

LatCrit submits this brief with the consent of the parties pursuant to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.
1
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leaders can only emerge from educational programs that—like the Mexican
American Studies (“MAS”) courses at Tucson Unified School District
(“TUSD”)—demand that students engage in critical and rigorous thinking,
and understand multiple perspectives. LatCrit takes seriously its obligation
to help build a pipeline of educated, critically minded Latina/o students, who
will serve their communities through their work in the private sector,
government, non-profits, and higher education.
RULE 29(c)(5) STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), LatCrit states that: (1) no party’s
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; (2) no party or party’s
counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief; and (3) no person other than LatCrit, its members, or its counsel
contributed money intended to fund preparation or submission of this brief.
BACKGROUND
I.

THE MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES PROGRAM
RESPONDED TO ARIZONA’S HISTORY OF
DISCRIMINATION.
A. History of Discrimination in Arizona.
Arizona has a long history of discriminating against Mexican-

American students. The first Mexican-American desegregation case was
Romo v. Laird, No. 21617, Maricopa County Superior Court (1925). In

2
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Romo, the Superior Court granted plaintiff’s request to enroll his MexicanAmerican children in the Tenth Street School (which allowed only white
children and had higher quality teachers) rather than the Eighth Street
School for Mexican-American students. Laura K. Muñoz, Separate But
Equal? A Case Study of Romo v. Laird and Mexican American Education,
15 OAH MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 28, 28-35 (2001).
Despite this early advance, Arizona continued to segregate MexicanAmerican students for decades. See Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004,
1007 (D. Ariz. 1951) (holding that segregating Mexican-American children
in separate buildings with inferior facilities was discriminatory and illegal,
depriving children of constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection). The Gonzales court reasoned that segregation of Spanishspeaking children retarded their English language skills, fostered antagonism
between children, and suggested inferiority where none existed. Id.
In recent years, the battleground over Mexican-American education in
Arizona has shifted to include bilingual education lawsuits. In 2000, a
federal district court held that Arizona had not provided adequate funding
and administration to support English Language Learner (“ELL”) programs.
Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1239 (D. Ariz. 2000) (holding that
state’s failure to adequately fund ELL programs violated federal law).

3
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Arizona failed to remedy these violations. Flores v. Arizona, 160 F.
Supp. 2d 1043, 1044-46 (D. Ariz. 2000) (describing the political context of
Arizona’s continuing inaction); Flores v. Arizona, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1112,
1120-21 (D. Ariz. 2005) (granting sanctions motion for Arizona’s six-year
failure to provide adequate ELL funding); see also OSCAR JIMENEZCASTELLANOS ET AL., ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS: WHAT’S AT STAKE
FOR ARIZONA?

15 (March 2013), available at

http://arizonaindicators.org/sites/default/files/content/publications/ELL_stak
e.pdf (“[F]unding and instructional practices implemented post Flores v.
Arizona continue to be inadequate….”).
B. The Mexican American Studies Program.
Arizona’s pattern of discrimination extends to TUSD, as found in a
1974 lawsuit brought by African-American and Mexican-American students,
which established intentional segregation and unconstitutional
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. Fisher v. Tucson
Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). As a result,
TUSD has operated under a federal court desegregation decree since 1978.
Id. at 1138 (reinstating jurisdiction based on district court conclusion that
despite the passage of thirty-odd years, TUSD failed to demonstrate good
faith compliance or to eliminate the “vestiges of de jure segregation”).
4
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TUSD created the MAS program in 1998 to address the long history
of racial segregation, racism, and significant race-based achievement issues
disproportionately experienced by Latina/o students in TUSD. ER 1851.
MAS courses were individually designed by the instructors,2 and they
spanned numerous disciplines, with courses in history, government, English,
literature, and art from Mexican-American/Latina/o 3 perspectives, and
aimed to address dropout and push-out problems, excessive grade failure
rates, disproportionate disciplinary issues, attendance issues, poor rates of
graduation, and poor matriculation in post-secondary institutions. ER 216061.
Courses within the MAS program welcomed all TUSD students, and
attracted primarily Latina/o students due to the group’s proportion of the
district’s general student population. ER 2203 (recognizing that “[b]ased on
the prevailing percentage of Hispanic students enrolled within TUSD, …
Hispanic students would ... demonstrate a larger representation as compared
to other ethnicities”); ER 2157-59 (describing student populations in various

2

Instructors did not need approval from the MAS director for their courses
or pedagogy, and the courses were taught in different ways. ER 609.
3
“Mexican-American” refers to people who claim both U.S.
citizenship/residency and Mexican heritage. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Why
“Race Matters:” LatCrit Theory and Latina/o Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2
n.3. In some cases, the source materials cited in this brief use the broader
terms “Hispanic” and “Latina/o.”
5
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TUSD middle and high schools as ranging from 49 to 94 percent Mexican
American); ER 2202 (noting that sixty percent of the TUSD student
population in 2011 was Hispanic).
C. Ethnic Studies Programs Enhance Academic Identity and
Achievement.
Social science research consistently has shown that ethnic studies
programs promote overall student success and respect and understanding
among races. ER 1913 (noting that “[b]oth students of color and White
students have been found to benefit academically as well as socially from
ethnic studies” and “ethnic studies play[] an important role in building a
truly inclusive multicultural democracy and system of education”). By
focusing on education that incorporates a student’s home/community
environment, students are more likely to engage in the academic
environment. See generally Curtis Acosta & Asiya Mir, Empowering Young
People to be Critical Thinkers: The Mexican American Studies Program in
Tucson, ANNENBERG INSTITUTE FOR SCHOOL REFORM, VOICES IN URBAN
EDUCATION (Summer 2012).
When students of color engage with scholarship about, and by, racial
minorities, research has shown distinct increases in academic achievement.
Id.

6
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Furthermore, identification with historical struggle and inequity does
not disempower. Id. (containing a first-hand account of student
development, empowerment, and achievement based on participation in
MAS classes). Instead, research has shown that familiarity with struggle and
oppression actually improves academic motivation. ER 1902.
Ethnic studies courses are especially important for individuals who
are neither “white” nor “black.” Historically, the United States has been
constrained by a bipolar construction of race; focusing on the black/white
paradigm silences other groups and leaves them without recognition. Juan
F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science”
of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997), reprinted in 10
LA RAZA L.J. 133 (1998). Many of these “other” groups had to fight for
basic recognition, such as inclusion on the U.S. Census. Stephanie M.
Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o Critical Theory, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 307, 310 (Fall 1997).
Research based on other ethnic studies programs demonstrates these
programs also improve academic performance. ER 878-82. For instance,
black students with higher levels of awareness of race and racism and higher
regard for their own personal ethnic identity are more likely to graduate
from high school and attend college. ER 1901.

7
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Data show a similar trend for students who took MAS classes. ER
1852-79 (analyzing comparative passing rates for MAS students and nonMAS students for the 2007 to 2010 academic years and finding more
improvement in standardized scores in math, reading, and writing for
students who took even one MAS class); ER 204 (finding by University of
Arizona researchers of “a consistent, significant, positive relationship
between MAS program participation and student academic performance”);
ER 2198-2320 (finding, in an audit report requested by the State, a “positive
measurable difference between [MAS students] and [non-MAS students]”
with respect to standardized scores and graduation rate).
Ethnic studies courses emphasize a critical analytical approach to
existing knowledge and scholarship. By design, they challenge settled
expectations regarding the factual understanding of the subject matter being
analyzed, illuminate how those facts would be understood by those with
different viewpoints, and invite students to develop their own perspectives.
Through such critical analytical approaches, ethnic studies courses cultivate
socially engaged individuals.
D. Ethnic Studies Programs like the MAS Courses Are an Early
Part of an Education Pipeline for Historically Disadvantaged
Groups.

8
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Ethnic studies programs do more than just improve academic
performance. These programs are the beginning of a pipeline to
opportunities that simply are not available to students who do not graduate
from high school, let alone those without a college or professional degree.
Ethnic studies programs also enhance the legal profession and its
membership by fostering inclusion and cultural competency, skills that are
indispensable for effective lawyering. ABA Mission and Goals, AM. BAR
ASS’N (“ABA”), http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/abamission-goals.html [hereinafter ABA Mission Statement]. Indeed, the
Arizona State Bar Association has recognized the need for an educational
pipeline that leads diverse populations into professions like the law. See
Diversity Pipeline Project, STATE BAR OF ARIZ.,
http://www.azbar.org/aboutus/missionandgoals/diversity/diversitypipelinepr
oject.
The MAS courses directly contributed to the ABA’s goal of
eliminating bias and enhancing diversity by “[p]romot[ing] full and equal
participation in the association, our profession, and the justice system by all
persons.” ABA Mission Statement. The MAS courses focused on students
who faced challenging social and socioeconomic circumstances in their

9
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personal lives and inspired them to reach aspirational goals. Acosta & Mir,
Empowering Young People, at 17; ER 1875.
When school curricula do not mirror the personal or cultural
experiences of these students, they feel marginalized. Acosta & Mir,
Empowering Young People, at 17. The MAS courses dispelled the resulting
environment of “distrust, cynicism, and disengagement.” Id. Accordingly,
students reported that they saw the MAS program produce positive changes
in their peers, and that they felt empowered and inspired following their
participation. Id. at 18. MAS instructors also reported that the program
appeared to “[liberate] students from the role of submissiveness, passivity,
and domestication that is so often the result of status quo educational
experiences.” Id. at 21.
Ultimately, ethnic studies programs like the MAS program prepare
students for more than higher education. They shape students into socially
engaged individuals who are knowledgeable about their state’s racialized
history and empowered to cultivate a racially integrated future. The
analytical rigor instilled by the MAS program provided for superior
academic outcomes and developed in its students the skills necessary to
recognize and traverse paths that will lead them to meaningful roles in
society, including the legal profession.

10
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ARGUMENT
II.

THE STATE OF ARIZONA VIOLATED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT.
The State of Arizona violated the Equal Protection clause of the U.S.

Constitution through enacting and enforcing A.R.S. §15-112. The
legislative history of House Bill 2281 (“H.B. 2281,” codified as A.R.S. §15112) demonstrates that intentional bias against Mexican Americans underlay
both the statute and the State’s selective enforcement against MAS courses.
The State’s conduct also imposed a unique burden on a protected class by
eliminating a reform program specifically aimed at benefiting that class.
A. Mexican Americans are a Protected Class.
The Constitution requires states to provide equal protection to all
people in the nation. U.S. Const. amend XIV §1 (“nor shall any state…
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws”).
All similarly situated persons must be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982). When a state law classifies by race, the law is subject to
strict judicial scrutiny because such classifications “are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining that such laws “are subjected to strict

11
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scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest”).
Like other Hispanic or Latina/o people, Mexican Americans constitute
a protected class that may suffer discrimination based on class membership.
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (extending constitutional
equal protection to Mexican Americans because “[w]hen the existence of a
distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as
written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based
on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have
been violated”). Because the Mexican-American students in the MAS
program represent a protected class, this Court should review State actions
impacting this class under strict scrutiny.

12
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B. The State of Arizona Acted with Invidious and Discriminatory
Intent against a Protected Class.
To survive summary judgment in an action alleging equal protection
violations, plaintiffs need only show a genuine issue of fact regarding the
State’s discriminatory intent. See Pac. Shores Props. LLC v. City of
Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs may
demonstrate this intent with “direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citing
the multi-factor inquiry in Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). “When a plaintiff opts to rely on the Arlington
Heights factors to demonstrate discriminatory intent through direct or
circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff need provide very little such evidence
... to raise a genuine issue of fact ... ; any indication of discriminatory motive
... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a fact-finder.”
Pac. Shores, 730 F.3d at 1159 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Here, plaintiffs have demonstrated that intent. Although A.R.S. §15112 was enacted and applicable statewide, the record shows that Arizona
officials used the statute to target those of Hispanic heritage by eliminating
courses designed to improve their, and only their, education. The Arizona
Legislature adopted H.B. 2281in the context of racially charged rhetoric that
produced other legislation targeting Hispanics. For instance, the Arizona
Legislature also passed Senate Bill 1070 in 2010 (the “Support Our Law
13
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Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act”), which many call the “show me
your papers” bill. 4 Pls.-Appellants’ Opening Br. at 32-33. See also H.B.
2779, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (imposing severe penalties
against employers who know (or should know) they hired “unauthorized
aliens”).
The legislative history for H.B. 2281 reflects this racially charged
context. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 2281 Before S. Educ. Accountability &
Reform Comm., 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Session (Ariz. 2010), at 2:11-3:22.
Representative Steve Montenegro, bill sponsor, testified that H.B. 2281
would prevent teaching courses designed for students based on “the race
they belong to or the ethnicity they belong to,” and identified the MAS
program at TUSD as one specific reason for passing H.B. 2281. Id. at 2:1214.5
At the time, Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Horne
was especially vocal about needing a law to dismantle MAS, which he had
long viewed as a “program that should be terminated.” ER 1054-58.
During his campaign for Arizona Attorney General, Horne explicitly
advertised that he singled out TUSD’s MAS program and touted its
4

The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently struck down several provisions of
this bill. Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012).
5
Rep. Montenegro described MAS throughout his testimony, referring to the
courses as “La Raza Studies” (“Race Studies”).
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wholesale elimination. ER 1802 (“[I]n Raza Studies they taught the kids
that the country is dominated by a white racist, imperialist power structure
that is out to oppress them. … [I]t’s a dysfunctional education and I fought
hard to get the legislature to … pass a law so that I can put a stop to it.”).
During his time as Attorney General, Horne’s rhetoric connected this
effort to border security, “illegal” immigration, and a conspiracy theory that
Mexicans are reclaiming the American Southwest.6 Superintendent John
Huppenthal also appears to subscribe to Horne’s conspiracy theories. ER
802-05 (repeatedly referring to a “battle” between the philosophers who
“created almost a perfect system of governance” and the “tidal wave” that is
“suffocating” and “threatening” this system by disparaging U.S. founding
fathers). 7 See Francis Joseph Mootz III & Leticia M. Saucedo, The
6

Horne’s voice is just one of many in the inflammatory rhetoric of the
“reconquista,” a theory that Mexicans are in the process of reclaiming land
in the American Southwest lost to the United States in the 19th Century.
Theorists include Patrick Buchanan in THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW
DYING POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY
AND CIVILIZATION (2002) and other “nativist” writers identified by the
Southern Poverty Law Center. See Sonia Scherr, Arizona Debate Unleashes
New ‘Reconquista’ Accusations, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (May 5, 2010),
http://www.splcenter.org/blog/index.php?s=reconquista.
7

ER 803 (explaining the philosophy and approach used when collectively
targeting the courses within the MAS program: “[W]hen Queen Boudica
encountered the Romans in England, she just attacked. And boy, was it one
heck of a charge. It was the full glory and everything, and she got
slaughtered. She outnumbered the Romans five to one, and they completely
killed everybody.”).
15
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“Ethical” Surplus of the War on Illegal Immigration, Iowa Journal on
Gender, Race and Justice (forthcoming 2012), University of California at
Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 291, 18, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042688.
The legislative record also demonstrates that Arizona legislators
intentionally mischaracterized the MAS courses and students as “antiAmerican,” and the teachings as “sedition” because “they advocate the
elimination of borders and the takeover of the Southwest United States.”
Hearing on S.B. 1108 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 00:16:45-17:00,
48th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008) (quoting Representative Russell
Pearce’s characterization of the MAS program’s teachings during hearings
on S.B. 1108, a precursor to H.B. 2281).
Finally, Arizona’s enforcement of A.R.S. §15-112 demonstrates the
law’s purpose to dismantle the courses within the MAS program at TUSD.
Superintendent Huppenthal even disregarded the state consultant’s careful
audit of the wide range of courses within the MAS program and the
conclusion that “no observable evidence was present to indicate that any
classroom within Tucson Unified School District is in direct violation of the
law, A.R.S. 15-112(A). In most cases, quite the opposite is true.” ER 2198-
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2201, 2248, 2253 (“All evidence points to peace as the essence for program
teachings. Resentment does not exist in the context of these courses.”).
Invidious, class-based legislation is unconstitutional and must be
struck down. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (“The Equal
Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all
caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.”). The record raises
numerous, and genuine, issues of fact regarding invidious and intentionally
discriminatory actions by Horne, his successor superintendent John
Huppenthal, and other relevant State actors. Those facts are sufficient to
support the conclusion that Arizona discriminated against a protected class
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Even if A.R.S. §15-112 is Facially Neutral, the State Violated
Equal Protection when it Applied the Law in a Discriminatory
Way.
The State’s enactment and enforcement of A.R.S. §15-112 is
particularly harmful because the overall goal of the varied courses within the
MAS program was to elevate, educate and protect a historically
discriminated-against population. The Supreme Court has held that state
laws that undermine corrective federal programs violate the Constitution.
For example, when Virginia officials closed public schools rather than
desegregate them per federal court order, the Supreme Court found that even
17
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if the state had a legitimate nonracial reason “to abandon public schools, the
object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to
desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.” Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
Prince Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). See also Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (holding that a voluntary
“freedom-of-school” school desegregation plan that resulted in continued
segregated schools more than a decade after Brown v. Board violated the
Constitution).
A.R.S. §15-112 dismantles a wide range of courses that effectively
countered prior discrimination, similarly violating the Equal Protection
Clause. TUSD developed the MAS courses in direct response to historical
discrimination in Tucson and the desegregation lawsuits against the district.
See supra Section I.B. As part of its desegregation effort, TUSD launched
MAS to address the absence of Mexican-American perspectives in the high
school curriculum, an absence that the district concluded was further
imperiling “at-risk” Mexican-American students. See MARÍA “CUCA”
ROBLEDO MONTECEL, INTERCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION, TUSD EXTERNAL AUDIT OF THE BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND
HISPANIC STUDIES DEPARTMENT 200 (1998), available at
http://www.tusd1.org/contents/depart/mexicanam/documents/IDRAReport1
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998.pdf. As described above, supra Section I.C, the MAS courses
collectively and significantly benefited students in the program—90 percent
of them Hispanic—by substantially improving state test scores and
graduation rates. ER 197-203, 1854-79, 2247.
MAS courses were a key component of the district’s effort to meet the
federally mandated goals under the desegregation order. See Fisher v.
United States, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2008) (noting in 2004
that the purpose of MAS and other courses in TUSD’s ethnic studies
offerings is “increasing academic achievement for minority students and
working to eliminate the over-representation of minority students in drop
out, absenteeism, suspension, and expulsion rates”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); ER 25-26 (recognizing the MAS program as a
component of TUSD’s desegregation consent decree); ER 1988-92, 1995-98
(MAS formally adopted as part of TUSD’s desegregation consent decree in
2009).
The U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Griffin and Green also establish
that a facially neutral statute can still be unconstitutional when it impacts
members of a protected class in an unequal manner. As the Griffin Court
explained, “Virginia law, as here applied, unquestionably treats the school
children of Prince Edward differently from the way it treats the school
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children of all other Virginia counties.” 377 U.S. at 230. Even if viewed as
facially neutral, Arizona’s selective enforcement of A.R.S. §15-112 against
the MAS courses raises a genuine issue of fact regarding disparate impact.
D. The District Court’s Holding Improperly Resolved Disputed
Issues of Material Fact Against the Plaintiffs.
The facts on the record are sufficient to create a disputed issue of
material fact regarding a prima facie equal protection violation, which is all
that is required to defeat summary judgment. Supra Sections II.B and II.C.
Yet the district court chose to rule on a motion for summary judgment that
the plaintiffs did not make, improperly extrapolating arguments plaintiffs
might have made for summary judgment on their equal protection claims
based on arguments plaintiffs made in seeking a preliminary injunction. ER
7-8; S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., Or., 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding that preliminary injunction decisions “must often be made
hastily and on less than a full record”) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). The district court’s sua sponte decision denied
plaintiffs the opportunity to come forward with evidence from which a
rational fact finder could find an equal protection violation.
The court’s error was especially grave because it pointed to facts on
the record that would support an equal protection violation, but then
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construed those facts in the manner most favorable to the defendants, rather
than the plaintiffs, as Rule 56 requires. ER 28-30 (remarking on, but
choosing to ignore, the evidence of discriminatory intent in A.R.S. §15-112).
A.R.S §15-112 has harmed and continues to unconstitutionally harm
Mexican-American students in TUSD. By adopting this statute, Arizona
disadvantaged these students through the forced dismantling of a program
that has been a success story for a protected class. This is an error that this
Court has both the power and the duty to correct. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute as
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
III.

THE STATE OF ARIZONA VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
The district court’s errors, and recent case law, require reversal. The

district court erred by reviewing Defendants’ actions under too lenient a
standard, failing to analyze the statute on the basis of viewpointdiscrimination, and failing to consider that the vague and overbroad
provisions of A.R.S. §15-112 chill protected speech of both students and
teachers.
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A. The District Court Erred in Applying a Deferential Standard
of Review to the State’s Factual Findings and to the State’s
Actions.
The district court erred in failing to review the factual record
developed during administrative proceedings de novo. In particular,
“[h]istorical questions of fact (such as credibility determinations or ordinary
weighing of conflicting evidence) are reviewed for clear error, while
constitutional questions of fact (such as whether certain restrictions create a
‘severe burden’ on an individual’s First Amendment rights) are reviewed de
novo.” Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. (Planned
Parenthood) v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir.
2002) (emphasis added).
Under circumstances similar to those present here, courts have
undertaken de novo review of the factual findings. For example, in
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Florida v. Miami-Dade County
School Board, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the removal of previously
approved material from a school library. 557 F.3d 1177, 1189-90 (2009).
The court analyzed the school board’s motivation de novo because the
board’s “motive in removing [the book] is a constitutional fact, a crucial fact
that determines the core issue of whether that removal violates the First
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Amendment.” Id. at 1205. The Court then extensively analyzed the factual
record. Id. at 1207-27.
Here, as in Planned Parenthood and ACLU of Florida, the situation
presents constitutional questions of fact. Defendants’ motive and purported
justifications for shutting down the MAS program are central factual issues
that touch squarely on the First Amendment constitutional questions at issue
here. Accordingly, Defendants’ motivation must be analyzed de novo by
this court, and the district court’s reliance on findings of fact from the
administrative proceedings is not entitled to any deference. See, e.g., ER 18
(relying on the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to find no
First Amendment violation). This is especially true where even the district
court expressed concerns about the quality and validity of the ALJ’s
findings. ER 405 (“the ALJ report ... is to me quite vague” and “the
complete opposite of the Cambium report”); ER 406 (“You know, anybody
could look at [the ALJ findings] and come to ... lots of different kinds of
conclusions.”).
B. The District Court Erred in Reviewing the State’s Actions
under the Deferential Hazelwood Standard.
Given a choice between three different legal standards from three
different Circuits, the district court, without analysis, picked the one most
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deferential to the school board. ER 13-14. Choosing to follow Virgil v.
School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989), the
district court applied the lenient review set forth in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1998). See ER 12 (“[L]imitations on
curriculum should be upheld so long as they are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”).
Hazelwood is inapposite here because student speech in a schoolsponsored expressive activity is not at issue. Hazelwood’s holding is clearly
stated: “[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 484 U.S. at 273 (1988)
(emphasis added). In other words, Hazelwood involved (1) student speech
(2) in a school-sponsored expressive activity that “members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Id. at 271.
School-sponsored expressive activity is not the concern here, and student
speech is only indirectly at issue.8

8

Defendants’ actions have, however, created a chilling effect upon student
speech by using student course work as evidence of illegality. See Pls.Appellants’ Opening Br. at 5-6. For that, Hazelwood is also not the
appropriate standard under which to analyze that impact because the chilled
speech is personal rather than part of a school-sponsored expressive activity.
24
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Instead, the concern here is that Defendants violated the student
plaintiffs’ right to receive information. The right to receive information is
central to a line of cases starting with Board of Education, Island Trees
Union Free School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (“[T]he right
to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”). On that
point, this Court has cited favorably to Pratt v. Independent School District
No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that “[w]hat is at
stake is the right to receive information and to be exposed to controversial
ideas—[which is] a fundamental First Amendment right.” Monteiro v.
Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1029 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998).
Indeed, this Circuit has expressed hostility to the notion that students are
incapable of thinking critically about challenging material.
First, the fact that a student is required to read a book does not
mean that he is being asked to agree with what is in it ....
Accordingly, the impact on student speech should be analyzed in light of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969). See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71 (distinguishing Tinker on the
basis that Tinker “addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises,” whereas
Hazelwood “concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored ...
expressive activities that ... the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school”). In other words, actions by the district that chill
protected student speech may not be justified as “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”
25
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Second, it is important for young people to learn about the
past—and to discover both the good and the bad in our history.
Third, if all books with messages that might be deemed harmful
were removed, the number of ‘acceptable’ works might be
highly limited.
Id. at 1031.
Although Monteiro left open the question now before the Court, 9
Pratt squarely addresses the issue here because it concerned the removal of
previously approved materials from the classroom in violation of the
students’ First Amendment right to receive information. In particular, Pratt
also involved a school board decision with insufficient factual basis, a
school board review that appeared targeted rather than part of a systematic
process, and a sequence of events that indicated an inappropriate ideological
motive. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 778 (affirming reinstatement of films banned
from the curriculum by the school board).
Per Pratt, “the proper framework for analysis here” is to analyze
whether the purpose of the restriction on speech is “to suppress an
ideological or religious viewpoint with which the local authorities
disagreed.” Id. at 776. Given the factual similarities between Pratt and this

9

“Because ours is not a case in which a school board has decided on the
basis of its own evaluations to remove literary materials, we need not now
decide the question resolved by the Eighth Circuit.” Monteiro, 158 F.3d at
1029.
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case, application of the Pratt standard will produce a substantially different
and more legally supportable outcome. Because the circumstances here
align closely with those present in Pratt, this Court should remand to the
district court to apply the standard set out in Pratt.
C. Sections 15-112(A)(1), (2) and (4) are ViewpointDiscriminatory.
“The government may not regulate use based on hostility—or
favoritism— towards the underlying message expressed.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). “It is axiomatic that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995). “When the government targets not subject matter, but particular
views taken by the speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant.” Id. (emphasis added). “Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.” Id.
Section (A)(4) prohibits “advocating ethnic solidarity,” which fits
within the Supreme Court’s definition of a “viewpoint.” This section would
be content-discriminatory but viewpoint-neutral if it forbade all discussion
of ethnic solidarity, whether positive or negative. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391
(finding a statute that targeted speech regarding “race, color, creed, religion
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or gender” to be facially content-discriminatory). However, section (A)(4)
prohibits only advocating for “ethnic solidarity.” As the district court noted,
to “advocate” is “to plead in favor of.” ER 17. Therefore, this section
permits classes that plead against “ethnic solidarity” but forbids classes that
plead in favor of solidarity.
It is this aspect—permitting a negative viewpoint on a topic but
forbidding a positive one—that the Supreme Court has found to be
impermissible viewpoint discrimination. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 39192 (1992) (invalidating a statute that prohibited negative speech about “race,
color, creed, religion or gender” where positive speech on that topic was still
allowed). 10 Section (A)(4) violates the First Amendment’s ban on viewpoint
discrimination.
Sections (A)(1) and (A)(2) of A.R.S. §15-112 raise the same issue as
(A)(4). Section (A)(2) prohibits classes that “promote resentment toward a
race or class of people” and section (A)(1) prohibits classes that “promote
10

The qualifying phrase “instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals”
exacerbates the viewpoint-discrimination. By using the phrase “instead of,”
the statute suggests that “the treatment of pupils as individuals” is a
viewpoint contrary to “ethnic solidarity.” Yet “ethnic solidarity” and
“treatment of pupils as individuals” are not opposing views on the same
topic. (Indeed, treating them as opposites further demonstrates the Arizona
Legislature’s mischaracterization of the ethnic studies programs and its
invidious motive.) Even if they were opposites, forcing a choice between
them would constitute illegal viewpoint discrimination.
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the overthrow of the United States government.” 11 However laudable these
purposes may be, these sections prohibit speech that purportedly creates a
state of mind (i.e., “promote resentment”) while permitting oppositional
speech on these specific topics. These sections are therefore viewpointdiscriminatory. Indeed, the language of section (A)(2) is substantively
indistinguishable from the language of a Minnesota statute struck down by
the Supreme Court as viewpoint-discriminatory. Compare (A)(2)
(prohibiting classes that “promote resentment toward a race or class of
people”) (emphasis added), with R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (invalidating a
statute criminalizing speech that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”) (emphasis
added).
Accordingly, this Court should invalidate sections 15-112(A)(1), (2)
and (4) because they violate the First Amendment’s ban on viewpoint
discrimination.
11

Some might advocate for a narrow construction of the phrase “the
overthrow of the United States government” to include only unprotected
speech (e.g., fighting words and obscenity). See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
381 (“[W]e accept the Minnesota Supreme Court’s authoritative statement
that the ordinance reaches only those expressions that constitute ‘fighting
words.’”). Section (A)(1) is not so limited on its face, and certainly not in its
application to the MAS program. Even if section (A)(4) were narrowly
construed, there is nothing to suggest that the MAS curriculum is
unprotected speech.
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D. A.R.S. §15-112 Is Also Impermissibly Vague, Overbroad, and
Chills Both Teacher and Student Speech.
1. The District Court Erred by Failing to Consider the Chilling
Effect of A.R.S. §15-112 on Protected Teacher and Student
Speech.
The district court erroneously refused to consider the impact of A.R.S.
§15-112 on chilling teacher speech. Instead, it found that the teachers had
“no protected right to speak as teachers, either within or outside of the
curriculum in the classroom.” ER 43 (emphasis in original) (citing Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)). This Court, however, recently held that
Garcetti “does not apply to teaching and writing on academic matters by
teachers employed by the state.” Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011, 1014
(9th Cir. 2013). Instead, the First Amendment protects a teacher’s speech
and activities pursuant to his official duties according to the test in
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Demers, 729 F.3d at
1014. In particular, a teacher’s teaching and writing is protected if (1) it
addresses matters of public concern, and (2) the employee’s interest
outweighs the state’s interest, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees. Id.at 1020-21
(reversing dismissal because Demers, though acting pursuant to his official
duties, was addressing a matter of public concern).
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Demers mandates that this Court consider the impact of overly broad
legislation on this protected speech. The MAS program teachers, while
acting pursuant to their official duties, were addressing matters of public
concern: namely, the long history of racism, including school segregation,
and significant race-based achievement issues disproportionately
experienced by Latina/o students in TUSD. For the reasons discussed
previously, supra Section II.B, the teachers’ important interest in their
students’ academic achievement and future success and in promoting a
pipeline of qualified, future Latina/o leaders outweighs the invidiously
motivated justifications offered by the State when it forced all of the MAS
courses to shut down. The district court erred in refusing to consider the
impact on teachers’ protected speech when ruling that A.R.S. §15-112 is not
overbroad.
The district court similarly erred in evaluating the chill on student
speech. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenges
because there was no direct ban on student expression. See, e.g., ER 11 n.7
(“That student work was used to explain the nature of what was taught in the
challenge courses does not mean that student work is proscribed by the
statute.”) (emphasis added). What the district court did not address is that
the students were punished for speaking because their speech was used to
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deny them access to the MAS program. See Pls.-Appellants’ Opening Br. at
5-6. This reasoning is insidious because any school board could indirectly
punish student speech rather than prohibit it outright. Indeed, by this logic,
the Des Moines school district would have acted constitutionally if, in
response to the Tinkers’ black armbands, it canceled all classes regarding the
Vietnam War. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (finding that suspension of
students who wore black armbands violated their First Amendment rights).
2. A.R.S. §15-112(A)(1) Is Impermissibly Vague and
Overbroad.
Section (A)(1) is impermissibly vague. Indeed, the Supreme Court
ruled that nearly identical statutory language was unconstitutional. In
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, the
Supreme Court ruled that a statute requiring the termination of teachers for
“seditious” conduct was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and chilling of
protected speech. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The statute at issue defined
“sedition” as “criminal anarchy,” which was further defined as “the doctrine
that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence ... or
by any unlawful means.” Id. at 598-99. “Sedition” also encompassed a
teacher who “advocates, advises or teaches the doctrine.” In other words,
the statute required the removal of a teacher that “advocates” overthrowing
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the organized government “by force or violence ... or by any unlawful
means.”
The Supreme Court found that this language was “wholly lacking in
‘terms susceptible of objective measurement.’” Id. at 604.
The teacher cannot know the extent, if any, to which a ‘seditious’
utterance must transcend mere statement about abstract doctrine,
the extent to which it must be intended to and tend to indoctrinate
or incite to action in furtherance of the defined doctrine. The
crucial consideration is that no teacher can know just where the
line is drawn between ‘seditious’ and nonseditious utterances and
acts.
Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
Section (A)(1) uses very similar language to the statute invalidated in
Keyishian. Section (A)(1) affects speech that “promote[s] the overthrow of
the United States government” whereas the Keyishian statute addressed
speech that “advocates” that “organized government should be overthrown
by force or violence, ... or by any unlawful means.” The verbs “promote”
and “advocate” are comparable, and indeed “promote” applies more broadly
than does “advocate.” See ER 17 (“in this way, ‘to promote’ is broader than
‘to advocate’”).
Similarly, the phrase “the overthrow of the United States government”
is comparable to, and yet broader than, the phrase “the organized
government should be overthrown by force or violence ... or by any unlawful
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means” because it includes activity that is peaceful and lawful, such as
nonviolent protest. Accordingly, section (A)(1) sweeps up substantially
more protected speech than the statute in Keyishian, and supplies
substantially fewer markers to guide a teacher or school administrator.
The Supreme Court took special note of the chilling effect of this type
of language upon teachers’ speech. “The very intricacy of the plan and the
uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a highly efficient in
terrorem mechanism.” 12 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601. “The danger of the
chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be
guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is
being proscribed.” Id. at 604.
For the reasons outlined above, section (A)(1) is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, and has an unconstitutional chilling effect on protected
speech.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling that A.R.S. 15112(A)(3) is overbroad, but should otherwise reverse and remand to the

12

The “plan” at issue in Keyishian involved a combination of statutory
provisions and regulations that collectively determined whether a teacher
could be hired or fired. 385 U.S. at 592.
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district court for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal
standards.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2013
K&L GATES LLP
By s/ Theodore J. Angelis _____
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